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Abstract—Flexible resource sharing at short time scales in
multi-tenant shared radio access networks has proven to be
quite a challenge. In this study, we develop a techno-economic
model that enables dynamic short-term resource sharing as well
as resource pricing, while simultaneously collecting revenue for
network expansion. In order to regulate the resource costs and
to prevent monopolization of resources, we define a unit cost of
resources which can be scaled dynamically. The proposed frame-
work allows operators to meet their individual utility targets
while optimizing their expenditures based on their respective
budgets. This work demonstrates that dynamic short timescale
resource sharing can help network operators achieve their utility
targets while minimizing their total expenditure.
I. INTRODUCTION
A multitude of applications, driven in part by the Industry
4.0 initiative, are envisioned for future networks (5G and
beyond), [1]. Most of these applications require not only
high data rates, but also low latencies. One of the potential
solutions to this problem is considered to be denser and
more heterogeneous network deployments, [2]. This, however,
places an enormous strain on the already decreasing prof-
itability of mobile operators, [3] and thereby, necessitates a
change in their current business modus operandi. One of the
solutions proposed to cope with increasing operational costs
and decreasing profitability is Infrastructure Sharing, [4]. As
the name suggests, this idea proposes that mobile network
operators (MNOs) share a common infrastructure in order to
reduce their capital and operational expenditure as well as to
offer their customers better prices, a larger number of services,
and a better quality of service.
As detailed in the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) report, [4], infrastructure sharing
can be undertaken at various levels. One of the most com-
prehensive methods of sharing is where there are multiple
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) who lease or rent
the infrastructure from an infrastructure provider and such
a type of sharing is the focus of this paper. In general,
sharing takes place based on service level agreements (SLAs)
between the parties who intend to share the infrastructure and
it usually takes the form of contracts which are enforced over
a long period of time. However, the OECD report, [4, Pg. 65],
also states: “savings from active sharing are greater than for
passive sharing as a higher proportion of costs are shared”.
Active sharing implies sharing radio access network resources
including the spectrum. This type of sharing, however, quickly
becomes infeasible if today’s (i.e. long term) SLAs are used.
This is because the MVNOs will not have the ability to
accommodate fluctuations in their traffic and might often find
themselves in scenarios where they risk being unable to cater
to their customers. Active sharing, therefore, requires a more
dynamic sharing methodology which allows MVNOs to share
and trade resources at much shorter timescales, i.e., in a few
seconds or minutes. In order for such a system to work, viz.
for it to be profitable for all the parties involved, each of
them should have a good understanding of their own budgets,
the implications of short-term fluctuations on them, and an
accurate estimate of their traffic load. It, therefore, becomes
imperative that each of the parties involved, be it MVNOs or
infrastructure providers, have sound techno-economic models
that are able to estimate aspects like resource allocation, the
required network expansion, and their implications on resource
pricing. As detailed in Subsection I-B, this is precisely where
today’s models fall short and this is an aspect this paper tries
to address.
A. Contributions
In the interest of facilitating the active sharing promoted by
the OECD, we propose a techno-economic model that allows
dynamic short term resource sharing as well as short term
price negotiations between the MVNOs and the infrastructure
provider. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• It provides a first step towards a more comprehensive
techno-economic market model for radio access networks.
• It proposes a short time scale dynamic trading model
wherein: i) the cost of resources is market driven, and
ii) the MVNOs trade resources based on their ability to
satisfy customer demands as well as meet their respective
budget constraints.
B. Related Work
Relatively speaking, technological models have garnered
more attention only in the recent past. Works such as [5]–
[9] estimate the performance and provide a comparison of
networks wherein both physical and virtual sharing of capacity
or spectrum occurs. These works, however, tend to be system
or technology dependent (e.g., focusing solely on LTE, etc.).
Lately, there have been attempts in papers such as [10] or
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[11] to provide more generic resource sharing algorithms.
The economic aspects salient to MVNOs are, however, not
considered in the aforementioned works.
Economic models, on the other hand, have been used quite
extensively to motivate the need for network sharing. There
are numerous works such as [4] and the references therein,
which focus on various aspects related to the costs of sharing
specific network components. More specifically, papers such
as [12] and [13] argue in favor of site sharing, radio access
network sharing, and core network sharing as ways towards a
sustainable business platform for the future. Other works such
as [14] and [15] also explore the relationship between network
costs and the extent to which networks are shared. Admittedly,
there is an implicit link between the technological and eco-
nomic aspects when varying degrees of network sharing are
explored. These works, however, do not shed sufficient light
on the technological implications (i.e., on the ability to satisfy
customer demands) of economic decisions made.
Another aspect - overlooked in most works - is the fact that
the models proposed still focus on long term SLAs, which do
not provide the flexibility required to enable active network
sharing. An added degree of flexibility in the SLAs is provided
in [11], where a sharing model, which allows the parties
to deviate from the constraints agreed upon in the SLA to
a certain extent while abiding by the SLA’s constraints on
average. This idea forms the basis of our work in this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In our model, we considered two different types of stake-
holders, i.e. a single infrastructure provider and multiple
MVNOs. Let M represent the set of MVNOs and let |M | be
its cardinality. Then, let K represent the set of active users that
are distributed between the MVNOs and let the set of active
users of MVNO m be represented by Km. We assume that the
decisions taken by a base station’s scheduler are not directly
effected by schedulers in the neighbouring base stations and
thereby, focus on the downlink of a single base station. Like
[11], we assume that there exists an initial agreement between
the infrastructure provider and the MVNOs, which sets the
initial values of the network resources to be shared. However,
unlike [11], we do not consider statically shared network
resources; instead, MVNOs update their share of the network
resources based on their respective traffic and utility targets.
A. Notations and the Model
To ensure consistency and clarity, this work uses the same
notations as those used in [11]. In this framework, Sm ∈ [0, 1)
represents the sharing ratio, i.e., the percentage of resources,
for operator m based on predefined SLAs and ∆m ≥ 0
denotes the maximum deviation from Sm (when averaged
over a certain time window). The average resources that a
particular MVNO gets cannot deviate from Sm by more than
∆m within W . Now, recall that our goal is to further a more
dynamic resource trading environment in which the MVNOs
are free to pursue their individual interests. With this objective
in mind, in the proposed framework, Sm and ∆m are MVNO
specific variables that can be re-negotiated periodically, where
the period specified by a time window W is determined by
the infrastructure provider. Note that, in this work, we consider
the existence of just a single infrastructure provider, who is
not subject to conventional market pressures.
Similar to most works having to do with schedulers, time
is discretized and partitioned into time slots. As in [11],
xk[n] denotes the fraction of resources assigned to the user
k at time slot n. Depending on the resources assigned, the
deviation of operator m from Sm at time slot n is denoted
by ϵm[n]. Additionally, rk[n] represents the achievable rate of
user k during the time slot n. Apart from the notation used
in [11], we also define new parameters relevant to a techno-
economic model. In this model, each operator has a budget,
Bm, that can be spent at any time instance n. We define three
types of cost, namely: capital expenditure (CapEx), operational
expenditure (OpEx), and pressure cost denoted by Cca, Cop,
and Cmpre (for MVNO m), respectively. The MVNO has a
CapEx proportional to its Sm, whereas the OpEx is based
on the actual resources obtained. This definition incentivizes
the MVNOs to utilize the added flexibility to deviate from the
original resource sharing limits agreed upon by coupling each
MVNO’s expenses with their needs and budget constraints.
The pressure cost, Cmpre, ensures that the costs of network
resources scale according to their demand and, from an infras-
tructure provider’s point of view, provides a steady revenue
stream for expenses like (longterm) capacity expansion. In
the market model considered, when the number of available
resources decreases, the cost of purchasing a given unit of
resource increases. In order to create this inversely propor-
tional dependence between the scarcity of resources and their
cost, the term ξm[n] – reflecting the difference between an
operator’s utility target (Uth,m) and the actual utility they
obtained – is used. Throughout the paper, we refer to resource
scarcity as the case where ξm > 0 and
∑
k∈K xk = 1
and to resource surplus as the case where ξm = 0, ∀m ∈
M and
∑
k∈K xk[i] < 1. The product of ξm[n] and C
m
pre,
therefore, provides the surcharge for the resources requested
at time slot n. Since the pressure cost is proportional to a
given operator’s utility target, a long term aggregate of this
cost results in the amount (proportional to the sum of the
utility requirements of all MVNOs) which should be invested
towards network or capacity expansion.
B. Assumptions
The salient assumptions are as follows:
1) Operator’s gap, ξm[n], gives complete information
about the additional resources required to satisfy an
MVNO’s target.
2) All the traffic is elastic, i.e., the traffic is not sensitive
to delays.
III. FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
A. Problem Formulation
Based on the notation defined in Section II, the generic
optimization problem solved at the base station’s scheduler
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min f(ξm[n], Smax) (1a)
s.t. Smax ≥ max(Sm, 1 − Sm), ∀m ∈M, (1b)
ξm[n] ≥ max(0, Uth,m − 1
(a+ 1)|Km|
n∑
i=n−a
∑
k∈Km
Uk(xk[i], rk[i])), ∀m ∈M, a ≡ (n − 1 mod W ) , (1c)
ϵm[n] =
(
1
(a+ 1)
n∑
i=n−a
∑
k∈Km
xk[i]
)
− Sm, ∀m ∈M, (1d)
|ϵm[n]| ≤ ∆m, ∀m ∈M, ∀n ∈ N, (1e)
n∑
i=n−a
(
Sm(Cca + Cop) + ϵm[i]Cop +min (ξm[n]C
m
pre, Bm)
) ≤ Bm(a+ 1), ∀m ∈M, (1f)
0 ≤ ∆m ≤ max(Sm, 1 − Sm), ∀m ∈M, (1g)∑
k∈K
xk[n] ≤ 1, xk[n] ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, (1h)
∑
m∈M
Sm ≤ 1 , Sm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M. (1i)
to dynamically optimize the resource allocation and pricing
is given by Equations (1a)-(1i). Ideally, the scheduler has the
achievable rates of users for each MVNO and schedules using
these rates. However, since the algorithm is proposed for a
real time scheduling problem, the optimizer does not know the
rates in the future. Therefore, the selection of efficient Sm and
∆m is not trivial as the MVNOs have to predict their future
needs extremely accurately. In order to solve this challenge,
the optimization problem (1a)-(1i) is split into a two stage
optimization problem denoted by P1 and P2. The individual
objective functions used and their respective constraints are
explained in Subsection III-B.
Our optimization problem considers a continuous objective
function (1a), which depends on two parts. The first part
minimizes the total gap between the individual MVNO’s
desired utility and their actual utility values at time slot n.
In the second part, in order to guarantee a fair distribution of
the CapEx among MVNOs, we minimize Smax, which denotes
the maximum between the SLA based resources available
to an MVNO (Sm) and the remaining resources (1 − Sm)
as defined in constraint (1b). The minimum of the right-
hand side (RHS) of (1b) can be achieved if Sm is selected
equal to 1 − Sm. Based on this logic, the optimizer assigns
Sm =
1
|M | , ∀m ∈ M , if the budgets of all MVNOs
permit it. Therefore, this constraint, i.e. (1b), ensures that
fairness is achieved in terms of the initial sharing of resources.
The MVNO can obtain additional resources (if available) by
selecting a higher ∆m value. The gap of operator m, ξm[n],
is constrained by (1c). The first term within the maximization
function in (1c) prevents the gap from being lower than
zero, and reflects the fact that the network (provided by the
infrastructure provider) is able to handle traffic effectively
enough that no expansion is necessary even in the long run.
The second term in the maximization function, on the other
hand, computes the difference between the desired utility –
denoted by Uth,m – of a given MVNO m and the utility
function Uk (xk[n], rk[n]) measured at time n, where xk[n]
and rk[n] are the percentage of resources and the rate assigned
to a user k during a particular slot n, respectively. Constraint
(1d) sets the value of ϵm[n], which is the instantaneous
deviation from the agreed sharing ratio. The first term on the
RHS of the equation is the average resources that MVNO m
obtained from the beginning of the current time window to the
current time slot n, whereas the second term is the SLA based
sharing ratio. When ξm[n] and ϵm[n] are calculated, each W
is considered to be independent of the other.
Constraint (1e), in which ϵm[n] is computed using (1d),
limits the maximum deviation between the agreed sharing ratio
and the obtained resources from exceeding ∆m. Constraint
(1f) is the budget constraint, which ensures that the overall
expenditure in a time window cannot exceed an MVNO’s
budget for that time window. The operator pays both CapEx
and OpEx for the fixed resource shares agreed upon in the
SLA, Sm, which is accounted for by the first term in the
summation on the left-hand side (LHS) of the inequality.
However, by choosing a higher deviation ∆m, the operator
has the ability to increase or decrease their expenditure in
relation to the costs computed using the SLA. This aspect
is taken into account by incorporating ϵm[n] in the second
term on the LHS of the inequality (1f). If the MVNO receives
fewer resources than Sm, as can be observed from (1d), the
second term of (1f) becomes negative and decreases the total
cost. The third term on the LHS of (1f) is the pressure cost
that is designed in order to regulate the demands of individual
MVNOs and to introduce a notion of ‘supply and demand’
economics to these short term resource acquisitions. From an
infrastructure provider’s perspective, it also acts as a means
to collect the necessary revenue for network expansion. Since
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Fig. 1. Two stage optimization solved at the scheduler.
the MVNOs are not obligated to spend their entire budget
during a given time slot, the unspent revenue from previous
time slot can be used during the successive time slot. This
effect is represented by the scaling factor (1+ a) on the RHS
of (1f), where a ≡ (n − 1)mod W . Then, constraint (1g)
introduces the necessary coupling between ∆m and Sm in
order to prevent the MVNOs from trading resources that they
do not have. Constraint (1h) ensures that the total number
of resources consumed is always less than or equal to the
total number of resources available and the network resources
allocated to any user k cannot be lower than zero. Finally,
constraint (1i) ensures non-negativity of the resources initially
agreed upon in the SLA and it also prevents the sum of Sm
over all the operators from being greater than one.
Note that the problem is presented in a non-linear form to
improve readability. It can, nevertheless, be lineralized with
standard techniques.
B. Applied Algorithm
Owing to the many fluctuations encountered during wireless
communications, the optimization problem to determine the
most cost effective resource allocation for a given MVNO is
solved in two steps denoted by P1 and P2 (detailed below)
and as illustrated in Fig. 1. During the first step indicated by
P1, the optimizer accepts Sm and ∆m as input parameters and
finds the optimum resource allocations that minimizes the total
gap between each MVNO’s target utility and the utility they
achieved. During each time slot within a given time window
W , the optimizer runs this resource allocation optimization
(i.e., P1) using the respective rate estimates of the active users.
At the end of W , the optimizer switches to the second step,
i.e. P2.
P1 :=
⎧⎨⎩ (1a) minξm, xk, ϵm
∑
m∈M
ξm[n]
s.t. (1c)(1d)(1e)(1f)(1h)
P2 :=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(1a) min
ξm, xk, Sm,
∆m, ϵm
∑
m∈M
ξm[n] + Smax
s.t. (1b) – (1i)
During P2, the optimizer determines the optimal resource
allocation for the previous time window (i.e., the window
that just ended) using the knowledge of all the rates actually
achieved. Then, based on these ‘optimum’ resource alloca-
tions, the optimizer determines the optimal Sm and ∆m,
and updates their values for the upcoming time window. The
update process is performed according to
Snewm = (1 − αm)Soldm + αmSoptm , (2)
∆newm = (1 − αm)∆oldm + αm∆optm , (3)
where αm is the feature scaling coefficient and S
opt
m , ∆optm are
the optimum Sm, ∆m values for the previous time window.
Both for P1 and P2, the optimizer uses the same objective
function. However, since the variables of the two problems
are different, the constraints that are applicable for each of
the problems will also be different.
C. Effects of Feature Scaling
The input parameters for P1 during the upcoming time
window are selected based on their initial values and the
optimum values during the previous time window. However,
the determination of the scaling coefficient is a challenging
task as large values of αm effectively leads to a memoryless
network resource optimization and very small values result
in a static network resource optimization. A comparison
between different scaling coefficients is presented in Fig. 2.
As presented in (4), the relative distance to the optimal
(RDO) gives an understanding of how close the selected
parameters are to their optimum values, ξoptm . Note that due
to (1c), the gap ξm[n] cannot be negative for any time slot
and ξm[n] ≥ ξoptm [n], ∀n ∈ N . For the special case of
ξm[n] = ξ
opt
m [n] = 0, the RDO is assumed to be 0; therefore,
RDO ∈ [0, 1].
RDO =
1
|M |
∑
m∈M
N∑
i=1
ξm[i] − ξoptm [i]
N∑
i=1
ξm[i]
. (4)
The dynamic scaling coefficient is presented in (5), where
ξoptm [n] is the optimum gap calculated by the optimizer during
P2. Since it is determined by the actual rates achieved, it gives
an idea of the minimum achievable gap if the scheduler has
a-priori knowledge of the rates.
αm =
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑i=n−a ξm[i] − n∑i=n−a ξoptm [i]
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=n−a
ξm[i] +
n∑
i=n−a
ξoptm [i]
, a ≡ (n − 1 mod W ) .
(5)
The scaling coefficient (αm) provides information about the
difference between the observed gap and the minimum gap
achievable per time window. Therefore, αm measures how
close the real-time scheduler performs to the optimum. Since
the network parameters are selected according to a given
MVNO’s targets, each of them has a different αm parameter
that reflects the optimality of their decision.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of different scaling coefficients.
Fig. 2 presents the variation in the achievable gap for time
windows of different lengths for various scaling coefficients.
Since we would like to evaluate the merits of dynamic short
time-scale resource sharing, we focus on time windows of
length 50 − 200 ms. For this range, dynamic scaling is better
than static scaling because it is better at coping with changes
in window size. Therefore, the dynamic scaling coefficient is
utilized in the simulations.
D. Effects of Pressure Cost
As previously mentioned, the motivation behind the intro-
duction of the pressure cost is twofold. First, it helps regulate
the price of resources (in scenarios of both resource surplus
as well as resource scarcity), while ensuring that the price a
given MVNO pays is proportional to their respective budget.
Scaled pressure costs ensure that MVNOs will have the same
chance to obtain resources and will be charged in proportion
to their budgets. More specifically, the operators will not face
scenarios where neither the purchase of resources nor the
pressure costs are unaffordable. Therefore, the pressure cost
is defined as
Cmpre =
Bm∑
m∈M
Bm
× Cunitpre , (6)
where Cunitpre is the unit pressure cost of a given resource.
Second, in cases where the gap between the desired utility of
MVNOs and their achieved utility is non-zero, since the pres-
sure cost is proportional to the difference between the actual
and desired utility values for each MVNO, the infrastructure
provider – by means of the aggregated pressure costs collected
– has the added advantage of knowing exactly how much has
to be invested in capacity expansion.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results of the two-step opti-
mization problem are detailed.
A. Parameters and the Scenarios Studied
In order to analyze the applicability of our mathematical
model, we considered the downlink of a base station that is
shared by three MVNOs, i.e. |M | = 3. All the users are
uniformly distributed throughout the coverage area of the base
TABLE I
THE APPLIED PARAMETERS AND THEIR VALUES.
Parameter Definition Value
Cca CapEx Cost 35.97
Cop OpEx Cost 25.69
Umth Rate target of operator m 2 bps/Hz|Km| Cardinality of the set of active users 1
W Time window 100 ms
|M | Number of MVNOs 3
N Duration of simulation 5000 ms
B1 Budget of MVNO 1 88.45
B2 Budget of MVNO 2 100
B3 Budget of MVNO 3 56.17
Cunitpre Unit pressure cost per resource 35.97
station and, at each time slot, only one user from each operator
becomes active. The simulation is run on a standard commer-
cially available laptop for N = 5000 time slots, where each
time slot is assumed to be 1 ms long, and the total run time of
the algorithm (including both P1 and P2) is 0.998 sec. All the
costs as well as the budgets are normalized to take values be-
tween 0 and 100
(
Cca, Cop, Cmpre, Bm ∈ [0, 100], ∀m ∈M
)
such that they can be considered as a generic value which can
be spent during each time slot n. It is important to mention
that the values of the budgets and costs are purely illustrative,
whose purpose is to help understand the characteristic behavior
of the model. Since the actual values that MVNOs use will
merely be affine functions of the values used here, the behavior
observed remains unchanged.
We model the channel between the user and the base station
using a frequency-flat block fading channel with i.i.d. Rayleigh
coefficients – resulting in exponentially distributed random
channel gains |hk[n]|2. The Signal to Interference-plus-Noise
Ratio (SINR) at any time instance is calculated as
γk[n] = |hk[n]|2SINRk, (7)
where SINRk is the average SINR of user k. This is calcu-
lated according to the Okumura-Hata propagation model as
SINRk = Pd−αk /(σ
2 + I0), where P is the transmit power
(in Watts [W]), dk is the user’s distance to the base station
(in meters [m]), α is the path-loss exponent, σ2 is the thermal
noise, and I0 is the average interference power. Based on this,
the spectral efficiency of a user (in bits/s/Hz) at time n is
rk[n] = log2(1 + γk[n]). (8)
Although the utility function can be something more intricate,
the utility of the operator is measured in terms of the actual
rate that a given MVNO’s user achieves. Therefore, in a user-
centric manner, the utility of each user is measured as
Uk(xk[n], rk[n]) = xk[n]rk[n]. (9)
B. Performance Results
In Fig. 3, we begin by comparing the ability of various
scaling coefficients to cope with variations in ξm due to the
updates in the values of Sm and ∆m caused by using (2) and
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Fig. 3. Moving harmonic mean of the ‘total’ gap of the MVNOs computed
over the all the previous time slots up to the current time slot n, for a time
window W = 100 ms.
(3). The results of using various scaling coefficients are also
compared with the case where the achievable rates for the
upcoming time slots are known and the optimization problem
can be solved for the entire time window as a whole. Fig. 3
plots the variations in the moving harmonic mean of ξm,
H (ξm, n), over all the time slots up to the time slot n in
order to ensure that its ‘peak’ variations are more accurately
captured than can be done when the arithmetic mean is used.
We observe that the dynamic scaling coefficient computed
using (5) outperforms the fixed scaling coefficients and is, as
a result, closest to the ‘optimal’ case, i.e., the case where the
rates for the subsequent time slots are known.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 document the variations in Sm and ∆m,
under two different cost scenarios. The objective function
minimizing the maximum Sm in (1a), results in the same value
of Sm for all the MVNOs as long as the MVNOs have the
necessary budgets. Therefore, for the sufficient budget scenario
(listed in Table I), since all the MVNOs never face a budget
shortfall, Sm = 0.33 for all the MVNOs (Fig. 4(a)). Since
each MVNO has the same Sm and incurs the same CapEx, this
can be considered as the cost incurred to enter the coalition. In
contrast to this initial sufficient budget scenario, for the second
scenario (Fig. 4(b)) all the costs are doubled and obtaining
network resources becomes more expensive. For this case,
due to the infeasibility of the MVNOs’ budgets, Sm takes a
smaller value than 0.33. By decreasing Sm, MVNOs decrease
their overall CapEx and also try to achieve their objective in
(1a). However, this CapEx adjustment is required only during
budget shortfall in order to avoid underutilized resources.
Fig. 5(a) shows the changes in ∆m when the MVNOs have
sufficient budgets. Since the window W is large, MVNOs
have the ability to balance their utility targets and resource
consumption based solely on Sm and their willingness to trade
short-term resources, i.e. ∆m, decreases over time. However,
during a budget shortfall, the MVNOs are not able to buy
enough resources due to budget infeasibilty. Therefore, they
have a higher incentive to share unused resources. In other
words, as observed in Fig. 5(b), the MVNOs compensate for
fluctuations in their resource requirements using ∆m.
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Fig. 4. Variation in Sm over time (W = 100 ms).
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Fig. 5. Variation in ∆m over time (W = 100 ms).
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 provide additional insights into fairness
in terms of resource distribution when there is no budget
shortage. Fig. 6 is the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the achieved rates for each MVNO. For all the MVNOs,
we see that the probability of having a rate equal to 0 Mbps is
around 0.6, which is a direct result of insufficient resources and
maximum-rate scheduling. More specifically, the scheduler
assigns all the resources to the user with the best channel
conditions. Therefore, in a crowded network with similar user
distributions, each MVNO can have the channel for 1/|M | of
the time. Fig. 6 also shows that the MVNOs’ achievable rate
distributions are very close to each other. This similarity shows
that, despite the initial differences in resource distributions,
MVNOs achieve similar rates on a relatively long-term. Fig.
7 plots the fluctuations in the moving arithmetic mean of ξm,
A (ξm, n), over all the time slots up to the time slot n. Despite
the large deviations due to the channel quality and the initial
Sm and ∆m values, it is seen that A (ξm, n) attains a stable
characteristic around 2000 ms. The fluctuations observed till
2000 ms can be attributed to the transient state of the model
and the non-optimal selection of Sm and ∆m. However, after
this point, they reach a steady state which suggests that no
further improvements can be achieved just by changing Sm
and ∆m for given channel conditions.
Finally, the costs for sharing over various time windows and
for not sharing are given in Fig. 8 for each MVNO. For the
no-sharing scenario, the MVNOs are assumed to have their
own infrastructure; whereas, for the static sharing case, the
MVNOs share a fixed portion of resources. For static sharing
case, since the MVNOs share a fixed portion of the resources,
we assume that they will also share the overall expansion
cost equally. The MVNOs’ costs are calculated using (1f)
and averaged over the simulation duration N . As observed in
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Fig. 8, our framework provides an expenditure scaling based
on the MVNOs’ utility targets and the resources they utilize.
In conclusion, by using a more flexible model, we obtain a
higher spectral efficiency than in static/no sharing scenarios
(as shown in [11]) at comparable costs while ensuring that
the MVNOs pay solely for what they use.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel dynamic pricing and
resource sharing algorithm for multi-tenant networks. The
framework proposes a real-time wireless resource market and
adjusts resource prices based on their scarcity and the need
for possible expansion in the future. This models also enables
MVNOs to adjust their total expenditure based on their utility
targets and the flexibility that can be tolerated while achieving
them. It also imposes fairness in terms of the MVNO’s SLA
based sharing ratio, which is considered as the cost of entering
the coalition. This model affords the MVNOs the ability to
adjust their total expenditure based on their individual budgets
and (user-dependent) utility targets. Finally, by proposing
pressure costs proportional to the MVNOs’ budgets, the threat
of monopolization is reduced by ensuring that MVNOs with
large budgets are penalized if they try to hoard resources in
order to artificially inflate the unit cost of resources.
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